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A nation which is dependent on another country
for the food consumption of its population cannot
but be a dependent hostage of the particular
country which feeds its population.
SWAPO of Namibia, Political Programme
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the
reality of others may be - can only be transformed
by detailed knowledge of it, by our own effort, by
our own sacrifices
Amilcar Cabral, late President PAIGC
(Cape Verde-Guinea Bissau)
If the people are to develop they must have power.
They must be able to control their own activities
within the framework of their village communities
At present the best intentioned goverments -
my own included - too readily move from a
conviction of the need for rural development into
acting as if the people had no ideas of their own.
This is quite wrong. . . people do know what their
basic needs are . . . if they have sufficient freedom
they can be relied upon to determine their own
priorities of development.
Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania
[1979]
Crisis or Crises? In Production, Prices,
Procurement?
The performance record of African agriculture over
1970-80 is not satisfactory [see for example World
Bank 1981; Harvey 19811. While data are fragmentary
and open to manipulation, the broad picture is of an
average rate trend of food production growth of
around 2.5 per cent a year, against 3.0-3.5 per cent for
population. In a majority of sub-Saharan African
countries there is a clear trend.towards lower per
capita food production and a rise in per capita food
imports. For industrial/export (so-called 'cash')'
crops the record is worse, with a trend growth rate
barely above two per cent.
To generalise is dangerous - albeit inevitable in a
short survey. Country records and experiences differ
radically. So do year to year performances (eg to 1980,
I Cash/food crop is the traditional dichotomy but a very bad one, as
the majority of African peasant households' cash income comes
primarily from sale of food crops or animals for local consumption.
Bulletin, 1982, vol 13 no 4, Institute of Development Siudes, Susses
Zimbabwe's agricultural output growth was below
population) and those by crop (eg Tanzania's trend
annual coffee output growth over 1976-8 lis 4.8 per cent
and cashew nut minus 12 per cent). Statistical data are
very weak, and hard to interpret without going back to
check coverage, primary sources and methodology.2
This is not a reason for avoiding any attempt at
analysis but it is a reason for caution in reaching firm
conclusions, for avoiding sweeping generalisations,
for looking at the particular and for scepticism about
the analysis of others (especially if one approves of its
conclusions) and self-doubt about one's own analysis.
Whatever the reason, production performance is not
satisfactory at sub-regional or, for most states,
national level. Given the crushing foreign balance
constraints following a radical structural worsening of
external terms of trade, both the buoyant food import
and the stagnant export side of the current account
scissors resulting from agricultural problems are
almost as serious as, or in some cases more serious
than, the nutritional3 and rural income implications.
Certainly the weather (either by a worse average over
the 1970s than during the period 1930- 70 or by change
in the number of consecutive good or bad years) and
socio-political instability (including war) have been
substantial contributory causes. However, they
cannot account for the whole difference between the
achieved and - say - a four to five per cent growth
rate and, even if they could, there would be a pressing
need to see how better output performance could be
regained.
Terms of trade have been a major factor. Over 1972-76
and 1977-81 a majority of African economies
sustained a halving of the real unit external purchasing
power of their agricultural exports. Not surprisingly
- except perhaps - judging by some analysis and
advice - to sections of the IMF and World Bank
- this reduced their domestic purchasing power and
2Eg, the share of commercialised peasant rice passing through
official channels in Tanzania was near 100 per cent, by 1982 it is near
zero per cent. Thus marketed paddy has gone from about 70-225
thousand tonnes but official channel data show 75-25 (state farm in
the latter year).
Recent Tanzania data suggest some nutritional improvement over
1970-80, while Ugandan rural data suggest that areas flot enmeshed
in actual civil disturbances are not experiencing radically worse
nutritional situations than a decade ago.
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explains why output of export crops has on balance
lagged behind food production. There is clear
evidence of cross elasticities among crops. That is,
shifts occurred among crops produced in response to
alterations of their relative prices, albeit neither in as
simple nor dominant a form as some commentaries,
notably the World Bank's AcceleratedDevelopment in
sub-Saharan Africa, suggest.4 Domestic terms of trade
shifts - whether measured in peasant prices/urban
goods prices or peasant prices/urban wages - have
not been uniform. While in most cases the rural side
has gone down, this is not universal (especially over
l975-8O). Nor does there seem to be a simple
correlation between overall urban/rural terms of
trade and output growth. This is not, perhaps, as
surprising as it seems for peasants do not usually have
much 'spare' labour or other key resources at peak
requirements times, so that higher real average prices
alone are unlikely to result in a massive increase in
output (the contrary view has been argued - to a
degree in AcceleratedDevelopment [World Bank 19811
and more forcefully by the Bank's Uma Lele).
On the other hand, even if 'getting the prices right'
seems less central - and, by itself, less successful -
than is sometimes argued, there is a case for arguing
that 'achieved production failures' do not relate
primarily to peasant ability to produce, still less to
'lazy', 'stubborn' or 'stupid' peasants, but are much
more closely related to growing weaknesses in input
supply, transport, storage, procurement and avail-
ability of actually desired, non-household produceable
use values ('incentive goods'). Weaknesses in research,
extension and technological change are not listed
separately, partly because they were no worse in the
1970s than before and can thus hardly cause the
worsening performance, and partly because on past
record and present expert proposals they seem
unlikely to be a relevant part of the cure in the 1980s -
except in certain special cases relating to seeds,
implements and epidemic disease control chemicals,
usefully subsumed under inputs.
Transport deterioration (closely related to fuel and
vehicle prices) has slowed, limited or prevented
marketing of produced crops (and thus deterred
4ii real cashew nut prices in Tanzania by about 57'/2 per cent
over 1979-81 raised output 40 per cent in the first year, but a 20 per
cent fall followed, despite the second half of the real price boost.
Cotton acreage has not declined significantly over 1970-80 despite a
real price fall of over 50 per cent.
'In Tanzania, for example, 1967-70 and 1975-80 saw significant
urban to rural shifts (cg over 1975-80 peasant producer prices rose
by at least 40 per cent relative to the minimum wage, and 60 per cent
relative to public Sector Salaries) while 1970-74 showed an opposite
swing so that 1966 and 1980 producer price/minimum wage ratios
Show no real trend, and 1969-76 saw a reduction in urban/rural
household income inequality. This is not typical, judging by price
data given in World Bank 1981 and Harvey et al 1981, but is also
probably not unique.
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subsequent production). Equally it has rendered the
supply of input and consumer goods erratic and
untimely. In addition, import constraints, failure to
allocate resources to developing and extending
appropriate seed, tool, disease and pest control
programmes and - in a majority of cases - 'urban
bias' in relative prices and/or allocations whether
through bureaucratic, 'free' or 'parallel' markets have
had the effect of depriving agriculture both of inputs
and of use values (urban goods/services) which
provide peasant households with an incentive to
engage in petty commodity production. It is no
accident that except in cases of natural or human
disaster (eg drought, war) rural food availability and
nutrition has not worsened much - the secular
increase in food crises or imports in Africa is
predominantly urban. This does not reduce the reality
of the crisis, but does raise questions as to its causes.
Procurement - both public and private sector - has
also worsened in many cases. In the first place buyers
are less readily and reliably available and less likely to
pay cash on the spot. In Mozambique, for example,
the departing colons took the rural commercial and
transport system with them, in Tanzania transport
and financial constraints radically worsened the rural
purchase-collection-payment records of most parast-
atals. In many cases disturbances (economic, military,
political) created 'choke points' at which a handful of
merchants could take control of the process of
commercialisation, allowing monopoly exploitation
of peasants. Both the food and coffee aspects of
Uganda magendo, for example, especially at its 1980-
81 'high' as a dominant sub-mode of production
rather than a secondary parallel market sub-system,
turned on the exploitation of such 'choke points' as do
somewhat analogous situations in Zaire [see Green
1981].
Storage debacles - centering on failure to expand
capacity and inappropriate selection of type and
location - have worsened transport bottlenecks by
preventing the smoothing of seasonal peaks in the
movement of inputs, crops and incentive goods and by
forcing (or at least encouraging) some procurement
agencies to move crops 'early and often' rather than to
hold at purchase point until a use point was clearly
identified. Horror stories of cross transport, back and
forth movement of the same grain, etc, abound. In
Tanzania arguably 150 to 200 per cent of the necessary
tonne mileage has been used with a high monetary and
opportunity cost in fuel and vehicles. Storage
problems have also led to catastrophic losses -
especially in the urban and national reserve subsectors
- eg, 600,000 tonnes physically destroyed, deteriorated
and used as poultry feed or exported at one-fifth
domestic food value to avert physical loss in Tanzania
over 1977-80. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
typical peasant storage has relatively low losses and
moderate quantative adequacy (unless there are
several successive good seasons).
That these factors seem to have had a greater effect on
long distance (urban) supply is not surprising. African
urban populations have exploded upwards, rising, eg
from three to 18 per cent in Tanzania over 1960-80,
and from 15 to 45 per cent in Zambia) but neither the
public nor the private procurement, marketing and
storage systems have undergone any similar structural
transformation. As a recent World Bank Assistance
Group report on Tanzania argues, the problem does
not seem to be primarily peasant ability or even
willingness to produce, but 'modern' sector inability
to procure, hold, move and distribute.
The state role in all this is complex - as the varying
terms of peasant price/urban wage trends suggest. It is
not limited to procurement or to 'urban' vs 'rural'
bias, much less to capitalist versus socialist orientation.
Three other critical issues turning on the state are:
ability to keep an orderly, stable state mechanism of
some variety functioning as against a descent into a
'magendo' dominated rural commercial economy (or
a wasteland ravaged by invasions in certain cases);
ability to procure enough import capacity to operate
the economy (including agriculture, processing,
transport 'incentive goods') at anything like existing
capacity; skill in relating rural resource allocations to
short as well as longer-term production.6
Toward a Rural Bourgeoisie?
One approach to crisis resolution would be to back the
emergent African rural petty bourgeoisie/kulak/
functionary sub-class alliance. This could be based on
a standard capitalist modernisation and production
ideology,7 on a more sophisticated African rural
development/production growth/household-clan-
state redistribution model, (an example may be
Botswana) or on a nakedly exploitative, short-term
interests of power holder approach like the rural side
of Ngugi's Petals ofBlood. In the first line of argument,
modern inputs in the hands of entrepreneurs freed of
traditional and state restraints is seen as necessary and
largely sufficient to achieve rapid growth. In the
second, the progressive capitalist farmers are seen as
adding to - rather than substituting for - pre-
existing output, and as strengthening the income
security of the rural poor by intra-extended family and
Eg, basic public services (including education) may be critical to
longer-term production trend increases, but not very relevant to
short-term goals.
An expatriate example is E. Berg whose basic position - somewhat
watered down, especially by addition - is at the core ofAccelerated
Development [World Bank 1981], and an official African one is
Kenya's famous Sessional Paper 10 on African Socialism
[Government Printer, Nairobi, 1965].
clan transfers. In the third, concentration of wealth
and power is seen as the way to achieve rapid
economic change and the breaking of non-economistic
links such as obligations to family clan as positive in
ensuring maximum growth, accumulation and modern-
isation. However, it could also be an approach
favoured by socialists for one of two reasons. First,
that a capitalist transition was needed to create the
productive force levels adequate for a transition to
socialism, or second, to create the production
relations and levels of visible local capitalist
exploitation and of antagonistic contradictions
necessary to achieve a revolution.8
The ultimate problem with these rationales - except
perhaps the last - is that the 1970-80 record offers
little convincing evidence that a capitalist trans-
formation in African agriculture is likely to be
achievable, sustainable or effective in achieving a rise
in trend growth rates to the four to five per cent range.
Certainly the data collected in the Annex to the Bank
study show how rarely this has happened to date. The
main variants of capitalist transition are 'neo-
kulakism' ('progressive farmer', 'modernising peasant'
etc); plantation and settler/'modern farm'. Although
each has some striking short-term success - at least in
its own terms - none looks generally promising in
Africa of the 1980s.
Neo-kulakism has its best record in export-oriented
and especially (not exclusively) tree crop production
under Smith/Myint 'vent for surplus' conditions
[Myint 1958]. It has formed the basis for most initial
export boom changes in agricultural production in
Africa (eg Ghana 1880-1910, Ivory Coast 1960-70,
Tanzania 1960-66, Botswana 1965-75 and, with heavy
state stock capital, Sudan 1950-65). But it has had a
distinct tendency to plateau at relatively low levels,
whether for external (terms of trade, food and labour
supply, land availability) or ecological reasons. In any
case, it is not clear that the neo-kulak element is
critical under present and foreseeable African
technology/support services/marketing conditions.
'Pure' peasants with little non-household labour (or
an exchange of labour among households) are not
demonstrably less effective at raising productive
forces, even if they are less effective at gaining access to
inputs and markets in a basically zero sum game
contradiction with neo-kulaks. Many of the latter in
certain post-1945 contexts have been 'economic
themes are present in Marx and in African Marxian writers like
Samir Amin. Extreme variants - cg the ultra-orthodoxy of Bill
Warren for the first, and the tactical capitalist road advocacy of
some Trotskyites for the second - arguably distort, as do the 'world
system analysts' (notably E. Wallerstein) who argue that attempted
socialist transitions sustained by neo-mercantilism on the periphery
strengthen capitalism at the centre and as a global system, and
should, therefore, be avoided (ie state power should not be struggled
for).
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activists', in trade or co-operative bodies, rather than
peasants, before acquiring land, and have neither
peasant nor modern farmer skills in land use.
The successes in raising marketed staple food
production by this route are fewer. The Ivory Coast
may be one (albeit less so in recent years, judging by
GDP and grain import data). One reason for this is
illustrated by the large-scale maize farmers of Ismani
in Tanzania - they were land grabbers and miners
who acquired and ruined good land over six years
(poor peasants did neither) and moved on - a way to
capitalist accumulation perhaps, but not to sustained
output growth. Similar problems arise in respect to
annual industrial/export crops, eg cotton (for soil type
and economically viable commercial rotation reasons)
and tobacco (because of fuel requirements) in
Tanzania.
World Bank and similar small farmer schemes, at their
best, are in fact 'neo-kulak' oriented, even if this is not
intended [see Wallace 19801. They do benefit some
labour-employing commercial farmers. But they
suffer from such high costs per acre, such egregious
technical errors (related to the data and analytical
base) and, often, from such large unanticipated
negative output effects outside the schemes [Wallace
19801 as to raise grave doubts whether their overall
production impact is much more positive than their
(clearly negative) influence on income distribution.
The clear exceptions in the Sudan and Egypt do not
appear to be widely replicable. At their worse such
small farmer schemes reduce peasants to penury (eg
Fleuve schemes in Senegal) or are disguised
plantations (disguised to outsiders, not to peasants
and managers or bureaucrats directly involved).
Plantations in Africa - including those peasant and
neo-kulak schemes so tightly organised as to be de
facto disguised plantations - always have higher
capital and recurrent costs per acre than neo-kulaks
and, afortiori, than peasants. Only for some crops and
under special conditions - sisal, tea and sugar fairly
commonly; wheat, rice, palm oil, rubber less often -
does higher output per acre offset these costs from a
micro viewpoint, and even then the higher import
component in costs (especially since 1973) raises
questions about national economic viability.
The need to pay low wages (given higher ratios of
other costs to production) and the authoritarian
production relations pattern create further problems
in production, as well as in socio-political terms. Land
is not in general scarce in Africa (especially around
plantations); thus for peasant households opportunities
to increase their cash income dramatically reduces
labour availability. This has been very marked in
9i labour shortage is fairly good corroboratory evidence to the
weak statistical data suggesting peasant household relative (and to
1978 absolute) gains.
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Tanzania over 1976-8 1 with special reference to the
more unpleasant jobs - sisal and cane cutting, and tea
plucking.9 It also affects neo-kulaks and 'modern
commercial' farmers - cg in coffee picking at Arusha
- but to a lesser degree.
The 'modern commercial' or settler model has even
less economic viability. Even under colonial conditions
with massive preferences the typical rate of return on
capital (after allowing a manager-level labour income
to the farmer) is 5 per cent to +5 per cent. This was,
and is, true of Kenya and Zambia (where there are
many African successors to the settler farmers), to
Rhodesia and now Zimbabwe, and to Namibia and
South Africa. Only subsidies, preferential access to
inputs/markets and stock capital provision can keep
this sector alive, let alone growing. As to do so eats up
most of the resources available to agriculture
(especially programme and policy design) the effect on
overall output growth is dubious, while that on
external account vis-à-vis peasant production) is
unambigously negative - the import content is much
higher.
The three capitalist roads all share two general
problems:
- if successful as general agricultural output
approaches, they would create a 50 per cent
redundant population (ex-peasant producers)
whom they could not employ,10 but whose access
to markets they would monopolise - hardly a
route either to socio-political stability, or to
domestic market growth of demand;
- mechanisation, intensive input packages and
large-scale schemes are highly import intensive
(up to 75 per cent of retail prices for sugar,
25 per cent of exfarm for grain - versus 5 per cent
for peasants in the latter case - according to
some estimates). Given the negative terms of
trade shifts since 1973, their micro and
especially their macro (national external balance)
viability is open to the gravest doubt.
Barriers to the Classic Socialist
Transformation Approach
The barriers to the capitalist plantation road and the
caveats about mechanisation apply forcefully to
central state farms, whether created from scratch or by
takeover of plantations/settler farms. In Mozambique
the result of concentrating agricultural sector
resources on the state farm (as opposed to the
communal or peasant household) has not been to
maintain marketed output (indeed peasant marketed
'° In the period of the 'Miracle Ivoirienne', the Ivory Coast had a
labour shortage - over 50 per cent of all unskilled labour were
temporary immigrants. The end of the labour shortage and of the
miracle appear to coincide.
output has held up much better), nor to ensure urban
food supplies (imports have rocketed). It has
prevented adequate attention to communal and
household production and to supporting services
(transport, inputs, procurement, supplies of consumer
goods), with an arguably negative impact on
transition toward socialism and on production - a
case increasingly made in Mozambique Party and
state circles. While some state farms/plantations have
served specific purposes (usually in contexts where
private plantations were viable) and do increase the
public sector weight in the economy, this is no
evidence of their usefulness as a conrol production
tool, while their production relations are notoriously
hard to transform to anything involving even
sustained pre-socialist worker participation.
Both state farms and capital/input intensive peasant
schemes suffer from the same problems of lack of data
to make sound technical choices, low returns to capital
and high import context as their capitalist variants.
This is as true when collaborators are European
socialists as when they are North Atlantic capitalist
bilateral and multilateral technical assistance per-
sonnel (a point equally valid in terms of the anti-
participatory nature of almost all standard expert
rural development advice, with partial exceptions in
the cases of ILO, WHO, China, Yugoslavia and - in
principle if unevenly in practice - Nordic bodies).
Even when the term 'participation' is used the word
seems to be defined as doing what others decide, or
putting oneself (if a peasant) in a new context more
conducive to effective coercion and exploitation.
Not surprisingly, therefore, state farms are often as
bitterly opposed by peasants as capitalist plantations
- and for much the same reasons. Both Lenin
[1976:303,355,362] and Engels [quoted in Lenin
1976:228] warned against coercion under such
conditions as damaging to the development of
productive forces and social relations, warnings
African experience seems to justify.
Communal production of main crops has an
unsuccessful record broken only by cases in which the
crop was introduced, or first commercialised, as a
communal crop (eg in particular villages in Tanzania
for maize, beans, tobacco) and there is no experience
of household cultivation. For example, in 1979 one
million Mozambicans (20 per cent of the probably
peasant population) lived in communal villages, but
only 70,000 (1.5 per cent) were producing crops
communally, and in Tanzania 90 per cent of peasants
are in organised villages with participatory and
communal structures but under five per cent of
'The distribution is uneven - over half of villages have negligible
communal crop production, perhaps 10 per cent over a quarter and
5 per cent over a half.
agricultural output (possibly under three per cent) is
communal."
The reasons are technical or technico-ideological. In a
majority of cases noboby knows how to produce more
effectively on a communal basis. Known models with
few purchased inputs are household based; most
appropriate inputs to be added are either just as
effective for household use (eg seeds, fertiliser,
insecticide, hand implements) or can be handled
communally without joint production (cg oxen, small-
scale irrigation, communal storage). Known large-
scale approaches are so intensive in purchased inputs
and artisanal/managerial skill as to be inappropriate
and unusable, and are seen as such.i2 Thus peasants
cannot usually learn the value of communal crop
production by seeing examples - on the contrary. As
agricultural services (even when not biased against
communal production) have no clearer ideas, and the
village committee able on its own to work out viable
new production relations, land use patterns and input
mixes is unusual (albeit not unknown), the slowness of
acceptance of communal production is not simply
related to the 'peasant mentality'. When there are clear
risks of loss and no clear chances of gain, peasants
would be very foolish to shift. The inapplicability of
the communal alternative thus prevents changes in
consciousness, and reinforces any existing attitudes
antagonistic to socialist transformation.
Provision of supporting services (as discussed in the
first section above) by governments seeking a
transition to socialism has been better than average in
respect to water, health, education and support for
communal investment projects, cg in Mozambique,
Tanzania, Cape Verde, Zimbabwe. That does nor hold
for procurement, transport, storage or input supply,
and very unevenly for 'incentive goods' allocations to
rural areas (Tanzania and Mozambique do make
allocations which reach rural centres'3 whether they
then reach peasants is less clear). Whether their record
is worse is unclear - private channel cost/surplus
margins in Tanzania for main crops with no official
channels (cg bananas, potatoes) are as high as, or
higher than, marketing parastatal margins. Urban
food deficits are as serious in Ghana and Nigeria as in
Tanzania and Mozambique. But the failures do
publicly discredit socialism, waste scarce personnel,
create parasitic administrators and waste public sector
resources. That capitalist performance is no better is
2 Tractors seem to be an exception. As their gift for good performance
often gravely damages a village's finances, they seem to play
(unintentionally) the role of a sacred white elephant given by a Thai
king to an unloved noble (ie, impose the ruinous expense,of a
non-productive but non.returnable asset').
' Horror stories of too much cooking oil, sugar, khanga in rural areas
in Tanzania are not typical of supply realities, but they do happen
on occasion precisely because allocations to rural areas do exist in
practice as welt as on paper.
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little comfort to advocates or would-be architects and
artisans of socialist transitions.
At a different level, a series of consciousness problems
arising from objective conditions plagues advocates of
standard Eurocentric models of transition to agrarian
socialism. Most African peasant households are not
sharecroppers, nor dependent on large farmers, in any
way analogous to Latin American minifundistas
although there are exceptions to this 'rule'. Nor -
except in the labour reserve economies and a handful
of special cases (egthe Ismani maize zone in Tanzania)
have they suffered directly from capitalist land
grabbing. Except in the labour reserve cases (including
those of Rwanda, Burundi and the Sahel where the
land and the labour surplus are in different states, plus
certain densely populated rural areas) the degree of
exploitation of rural wage labour is limited, because
there is a real option of entering peasant household
production. Therefore, there is no general con-
sciousness of domestic capitalist landlord/employer
exploitation even vaguely comparable to that in much
of Latin America, Asia or pre-socialist Central and
Eastern Europe. Such a consciousness may be
developing - eg in Kenya and Zimbabwe - but does
not exist yet, and (as has usually been true elsewhere)
tends to take peasant household oriented populist
forms more often than socialist, ie China and Vietnam
are no handier off-the-shelf tool kits than the Soviet
Union (whether of war communism, the NEP or of
collectivisation).
Some Building Blocks Toward Communal!
Socialist Transformation?
Must one then join the dirge - largely sung by well-
paid expatriates who have no share in the misery, often
condemn their own sub-class members' past advice,
and can walk away from the scene'4 - on socialist
transitions, egalitarianism, basic service provision and
production in rural Africa? The chorus has eminent
members, is broad church with as many left and right
members and is the fashionable intellectual orthodoxy
of the moment.
Not self-evidently. If one looks at rural development
more generally results are by no means uniformly
negligible, let alone negative in respect to social
relations, productive forces and socialist transition.
First, broadening community size through encour-
aging, supporting and on occasions requiring shifts
from isolated homestead to village settlements
' Precisely because the author is too committed for too long to feel
able to walk away he is doubtless prone to the opposite error of
objectively excessive hopefulness at the level of will, if not
necessarily of intellect.
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patterns - a prerequisite to organisation on control
by any state or economic organ has been widely
accepted (especially after the event) in several states,
eg Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Tanzania. It has -
however imperfectly and ambiguously - raised
peasant consciousness, self-organisation and power
vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, and - more often than not
- rich peasants, as well as in many cases increasing
women's self-consciousness, self-organisation and
access to power, services, land and income.
Second, where seriously pushed (usually by socialist
oriented governments) the improvements of rural
basic services (adult and primary education, pre-
ventative and basic curative health, pure water) has
been very marked (eg 10 to 65 per cent rural adult
literacy in Tanzania 1961-81). Presumably a better
educated, healthier peasantry used to demanding and
getting the services it wants is likely to dvelop a
different consciousness in respect to material
constraints and to antagonistic sub-class and
institutional interests. Four service areas (pure water,
mother and child care, communal wood lots, universal
literacy) have positive implications for reducing the
subordination of women.
Third, the limited communal production of main crops
is often paralleled by substantial communal activity in
trade (crop buying and village retailing), transport,
dairy herds and/or small scale manufacturing or
servicing workshops. Even more notable are com-
munal investment of labour, material inputs and
money in housing, roads and bridges, water supply,
health and education buildings, housing, small-scale
irrigation, land clearing and afforestation (wood lot,
crop bearing trees, watershed protection). In Tanzania
half the villages have viable communal shops, and
total rural communal investment is at least $150-
200 mn a year (3 to 4 per cent and 10 to 12 per cent of
GDP and Fixed investment estimates which exclude it).
This suggests that a wide range of communal
production and expanded reproduction activities are
carried out by the peasantry in countries of socialist
orientation, with the likelihood of actual net
communal benefits.
Fourth, some state enterprises have demonstrated that
improved transport and procurement can cause
explosive rises in marketed (and in these cases
probably total) output - eg the 'new grain surplus'
regions of Tanzania.'5 Other have had dramatic
success at production promotion or support - eg the
Tanzania annual coffee growth trend over 1975/76-
80/81 has been 4.8 per cent whereas in the early 1970s
the agricultural advice was that coffee berry disease
"This output enhancement on Smith/Myint 'vent for surplus' lines
does pose problems (especially since 1973) in respect to transport
costs.
would wipe out two-thirds of the existing output. CBD
was controlled, general husbandry (unevenly)
improved and new areas given (still weak) access to
inputs and buyers. In short, there is no general record
of institutional failure in managed market socialist
attempts, just as it is false to argue that the capitalist
'free' market road has been a success in Africa.
To analyse what these patterns and events mean
requires rather more careful observation and humility
and rather less attempt to fit African contexts into
European historic sequences (of whatever ideology)
than has been usual to date. The point is not to avoid
reading Marx and Engels and Lenin, but rather how to
go about it. For example, Lenin's texts on the
inadvisability of coercing middle peasants, on the
rationale for the NEP [Lenin 1976, pp 235,354, 396 if]
as well as on the desirability, if possible, of evolving an
efficient peasant family farming system along the lines
of nineteenth century America [Lenin 1976, p 183] are
perhaps more apropos to Africa than most of the more
recent Marxian writing. There is an equal need to read
serious African theorists and activists such as Cabrai'6
and Nyerere [see Nyerere 1967, 1968, 1973, 1977]
paying attention to what they have argued and
attempted in what context and why, especially when it
conflicts with European socialist applied analysis,
sequences and praxis. In particular, misinterpretations
of Cabrai as arguing that the petit bourgeoisie, as a
class, would or could commit class suicide by
becoming the proletariat in Guinea Bissau, or
elsewhere, or Nyerere as developing an arcadian
model to be copied rather than a mobilising myth (in
the technical sense of that term) both mystify and win
debating points at a high price in obfuscation of the
cases and contexts in point, and prevent serious
analysis of the viable strategies and tactics for
achieving transitions to socialism in Africa more
generally.
Certain basic theoretical premises may also require
reappraisal. One is whether the agricultural sector in
most African contexts does or can generate a net
surplus. The evidence on household cash flow and
government transactions in fanzania suggests a
negative answer [Wagao 1981] as do physical
productivity levels in different sectors in many African
countries. This is not to deny the sector's importance
in producing basic commodities and in transforming
the surpluses of other sectors into foreign exchange,
and thus into specific fixed and circulating capital
elements not producible locally. The answer (which is
unlikely to be the same for all African countries or
crops) is a critical one for policy.
16 For an introduction see Davidson 1982.
Finally, if socialist transition is seen as participatory
- in Cabral's sense as changing perceptions,
consciousness and social relations - considerably
more willingness to listen to and learn from peasants,
and to consider sequences from their point of view is
required. Hard-line production socialists seem to
ignore or deny this even more frequently than pure
capitalist intellectuals. When they at the same time
decry 'socialism from above' an apparent practical
contradiction arises which is not resolved by asserting
that the peasants suffer from false consciousness (even
if the assertion is in some objective and contextual
sense valid). The record both of agricultural
experts and socialist transition experts in Africa
(including African ones) is uneven enough and the
results of their efforts unsatisfactory enough to make
the case for considering peasants as active subjects
rather than passive objects, appear strong even on the
narrowest pragmatic grounds.
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